Paper 2022/1275 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1275 ↗
DiAE: Re-rolling the DiSE
Abstract
The notion of distributed authenticated encryption was formally introduced by Agrawal et al. in ACM CCS 2018. In their work, they propose the DiSE construction building upon a distributed PRF (DPRF), a commitment scheme and a PRG. We show that most of their constructions do not meet some of the claimed security guarantees. In fact, all the concrete instantiations of DiSE, as well as multiple follow-up papers (one accepted at ACM CCS 2021), fail to satisfy their strongly-secure definitions. We give simple fixes for these constructions and prove their security. We also propose a new construction DiAE using an encryptment instead of a commitment. This modification dispenses with the need to buffer the entire message throughout the encryption protocol, which in turn enables implementations with constant RAM footprint and online message encryption. This is particularly interesting for constrained IoT devices. Finally, we implement and benchmark DiAE and show that it performs similarly to the original DiSE construction.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2022-09-26: last updated
- 2022-09-26: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1275
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1275,
author = {Alexandre Duc and Robin Müller and Damian Vizár},
title = {DiAE: Re-rolling the DiSE},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1275},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1275}
}