Paper 2022/1389 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1389 ↗

Practical Asynchronous High-threshold Distributed Key Generation and Distributed Polynomial Sampling

Sourav Das
Zhuolun Xiang
Lefteris Kokoris-Kogias
Ling Ren
Abstract

Distributed Key Generation (DKG) is a technique to bootstrap threshold cryptosystems without a trusted party. DKG is an essential building block to many decentralized protocols such as randomness beacons, threshold signatures, Byzantine consensus, and multiparty computation. While significant progress has been made recently, existing asynchronous DKG constructions are inefficient when the reconstruction threshold is larger than one-third of the total nodes. In this paper, we present a simple and concretely efficient asynchronous DKG (ADKG) protocol among $n=3t+1$ nodes that can tolerate up to $t$ malicious nodes and support any reconstruction threshold $\ell\ge t$. Our protocol has an expected $O(\kappa n^3)$ communication cost, where $\kappa$ is a security parameter, and only assumes the hardness of Discrete Logarithm. The core ingredient of our ADKG protocol is an asynchronous protocol to secret share a random polynomial of degree $\ell\ge t$, which has other applications such as asynchronous proactive secret sharing and asynchronous multiparty computation. We implement our high-threshold ADKG protocol and evaluate it using a network of up to 128 geographically distributed nodes. Our evaluation shows that our high-threshold ADKG protocol reduces the running time by $90\%$ and reduces the bandwidth usage by $80\%$ over state-of-the-art.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2023-04-24: last updated
2022-10-14: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1389
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1389,
      author = {Sourav Das and Zhuolun Xiang and Lefteris Kokoris-Kogias and Ling Ren},
      title = {Practical Asynchronous High-threshold Distributed Key Generation and Distributed Polynomial Sampling},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1389},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1389}
}
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