Paper 2022/139 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/139 ↗
Sponge-based Authenticated Encryption: Security against Quantum Attackers
Abstract
In this work, we study the security of sponge-based authenticated encryption schemes against quantum attackers. In particular, we analyse the sponge-based authenticated encryption scheme SLAE as put forward by Degabriele et al. (ASIACRYPT'19). We show that the scheme achieves security in the post-quantum (QS1) setting in the quantum random oracle model by using the one-way to hiding lemma. Furthermore, we analyse the scheme in a fully-quantum (QS2) setting. There we provide a set of attacks showing that SLAE does not achieve ciphertext indistinguishability and hence overall does not provide the desired level of security.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2022-09-28: last updated
- 2022-02-09: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/139
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/139,
author = {Christian Janson and Patrick Struck},
title = {Sponge-based Authenticated Encryption: Security against Quantum Attackers},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/139},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/139}
}