Paper 2022/1441 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1441 ↗
Tighter Post-quantum Proof for Plain FDH, PFDH and GPV-IBE
Abstract
In CRYPTO 2012, Zhandry developed generic semi-constant oracle technique and proved security of an identity-based encryption scheme, GPV-IBE, and full domain hash (FDH) signature scheme in the quantum random oracle model (QROM). However, the reduction provided by Zhandry incurred a quadratic reduction loss. In this work, we provide a much tighter proof, with linear reduntion loss, for the FDH, probabilistc FDH (PFDH), and GPV-IBE in the QROM. Our proof is based on the measure-and-reprogram technique developed by Don, Fehr, Majenz and Schaffner.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-01-28: last updated
- 2022-10-22: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1441
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1441,
author = {Yu Liu and Haodong Jiang and Yunlei Zhao},
title = {Tighter Post-quantum Proof for Plain FDH, PFDH and GPV-IBE},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1441},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1441}
}