Paper 2022/1452 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1452 ↗
A Side-Channel Attack on a Hardware Implementation of CRYSTALS-Kyber
Abstract
CRYSTALS-Kyber has been recently selected by the NIST as a new public-key encryption and key-establishment algorithm to be standardized. This makes it important to assess how well CRYSTALS-Kyber implementations withstand side-channel attacks. Software implementations of CRYSTALS-Kyber have been already analyzed and the discovered vulnerabilities were patched in the subsequently released versions. In this paper, we present a profiling side-channel attack on a hardware implementation of CRYSTALS-Kyber with the security parameter $k = 3$, Kyber768. Since hardware implementations carry out computation in parallel, they are typically more difficult to break than their software counterparts. We demonstrate a successful message (session key) recovery by deep learning-based power analysis. Our results indicate that currently available hardware implementations of CRYSTALS-Kyber need better protection against side-channel attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2022-10-24: last updated
- 2022-10-24: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1452
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1452,
author = {Yanning Ji and Ruize Wang and Kalle Ngo and Elena Dubrova and Linus Backlund},
title = {A Side-Channel Attack on a Hardware Implementation of CRYSTALS-Kyber},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1452},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1452}
}