Paper 2022/1481 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1481 ↗
Secure Messaging with Strong Compromise Resilience, Temporal Privacy, and Immediate Decryption
Abstract
Recent years have seen many advances in designing secure messaging protocols, aiming at provably strong security properties in theory or high efficiency for real-world practical deployment. However, important trade-off areas of the design space inbetween these elements have not yet been explored. In this work we design the first provably secure protocol that at the same time achieves (i) strong resilience against finegrained compromise, (ii) temporal privacy, and (iii) immediate decryption with constant-size overhead, notably, in the postquantum (PQ) setting. Besides these main design goals, we introduce a novel definition of offline deniability suitable for our setting, and prove that our protocol meets it, notably when combined with a PQ offline deniable initial key exchange.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-08-17: last updated
- 2022-10-28: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1481
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1481,
author = {Cas Cremers and Mang Zhao},
title = {Secure Messaging with Strong Compromise Resilience, Temporal Privacy, and Immediate Decryption},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1481},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1481}
}