Paper 2022/1529 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1529 ↗
Key-Recovery Fault Injection Attack on the Classic McEliece KEM
Abstract
We present a key-recovery fault injection attack on the Classic McEliece Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM). The fault injections target the error-locator polynomial of the Goppa code and the validity checks in the decryption algorithm, making a chosen ciphertext attack possible. Faulty decryption outputs are used to generate a system of polynomial equations in the secret support elements of the Goppa code. After solving the equations, we can determine a suitable Goppa polynomial and form an alternative secret key. To demonstrate the feasibility of the attack on hardware, we simulate the fault injections on virtual prototypes of two RISC-V cores at register-transfer level.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2022-11-04: last updated
- 2022-11-04: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1529
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1529,
author = {Sabine Pircher and Johannes Geier and Julian Danner and Daniel Mueller-Gritschneder and Antonia Wachter-Zeh},
title = {Key-Recovery Fault Injection Attack on the Classic McEliece KEM},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1529},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1529}
}