Paper 2022/1681 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1681 ↗

Backdooring Post-Quantum Cryptography: Kleptographic Attacks on Lattice-based KEMs

Prasanna Ravi
Shivam Bhasin
Anupam Chattopadhyay
Aikata
Sujoy Sinha Roy
Abstract

Post-quantum Cryptography (PQC) has reached the verge of standardization competition, with Kyber as a winning candidate. In this work, we demonstrate practical backdoor insertion in Kyber through kleptrography. The backdoor can be inserted using classical techniques like ECDH or post-quantum Classic Mceliece. The inserted backdoor targets the key generation procedure where generated output public keys subliminally leak information about the secret key to the owner of the backdoor. We demonstrate first practical instantiations of such attack at the protocol level by validating it on TLS 1.3.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2022-12-03: last updated
2022-12-02: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1681
License
https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1681,
      author = {Prasanna Ravi and Shivam Bhasin and Anupam Chattopadhyay and Aikata and Sujoy Sinha Roy},
      title = {Backdooring Post-Quantum Cryptography: Kleptographic Attacks on Lattice-based KEMs},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1681},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1681}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.