Paper 2022/1711 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1711 ↗
Nonce- and Redundancy-encrypting Modes with Farfalle
Abstract
Nonces are a fact of life for achieving semantic security. Generating a uniformly random nonce can be costly and may not always be feasible. Using anything other than uniformly random bits can result in information leakage; e.g., a timestamp can deanonymize a communication and a counter can leak the quantity of transmitted messages. Ideally, we would like to be able to efficiently encrypt the nonce to 1) avoid needing uniformly random bits and 2) avoid information leakage. This paper presents new modes built on top of Farfalle that achieve nonce and redundancy encryption in the AEAD and onion AE settings.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2025-06-21: last updated
- 2022-12-09: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1711
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1711,
author = {Seth Hoffert},
title = {Nonce- and Redundancy-encrypting Modes with Farfalle},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1711},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1711}
}