Paper 2022/1724 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1724 ↗

Formal Analysis of SPDM: Security Protocol and Data Model version 1.2

Cas Cremers
Alexander Dax
Aurora Naska
Abstract

DMTF is a standards organization by major industry players in IT infrastructure including AMD, Alibaba, Broadcom, Cisco, Dell, Google, Huawei, IBM, Intel, Lenovo, and NVIDIA, which aims to enable interoperability, e.g., including cloud, virtualization, network, servers and storage. It is currently standardizing a security protocol called SPDM, which aims to secure communication over the wire and to enable device attestation, notably also explicitly catering for communicating hardware components. The SPDM protocol inherits requirements and design ideas from IETF’s TLS 1.3. However, its state machines and transcript handling are substantially different and more complex. While architecture, specification, and open-source libraries of the current versions of SPDM are publicly available, these include no significant security analysis of any kind. In this work we develop the first formal models of the three modes of the SPDM protocol version 1.2.1, and formally analyze their main security properties.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2024-08-05: last updated
2022-12-14: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1724
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1724,
      author = {Cas Cremers and Alexander Dax and Aurora Naska},
      title = {Formal Analysis of SPDM: Security Protocol and Data Model version 1.2},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1724},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1724}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.