Paper 2022/1746 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/1746 ↗

Clipaha: A Scheme to Perform Password Stretching on the Client

Francisco Blas Izquierdo Riera
Magnus Almgren
Pablo Picazo-Sanchez
Christian Rohner
Abstract

Password security relies heavily on the choice of password by the user but also on the one-way hash functions used to protect stored passwords. To compensate for the increased computing power of attackers, modern password hash functions like Argon2, have been made more complex in terms of computational power and memory requirements. Nowadays, the computation of such hash functions is performed usually by the server (or authenticator) instead of the client. Therefore, constrained Internet of Things devices cannot use such functions when authenticating users. Additionally, the load of computing such functions may expose servers to denial of service attacks. In this work, we discuss client-side hashing as an alternative. We propose Clipaha, a client-side hashing scheme that allows using high-security password hashing even on highly constrained server devices. Clipaha is robust to a broader range of attacks compared to previous work and covers important and complex usage scenarios. Our evaluation discusses critical aspects involved in client-side hashing. We also provide an implementation of Clipaha in the form of a web library and benchmark the library on different systems to understand its mixed JavaScript and WebAssembly approach's limitations. Benchmarks show that our library is 50\% faster than similar libraries and can run on some devices where previous work fails.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2022-12-19: last updated
2022-12-19: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/1746
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1746,
      author = {Francisco Blas Izquierdo Riera and Magnus Almgren and Pablo Picazo-Sanchez and Christian Rohner},
      title = {Clipaha: A Scheme to Perform Password Stretching on the Client},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1746},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1746}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.