Paper 2022/255 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/255 ↗
Round-Optimal Byzantine Agreement
Abstract
Byzantine agreement is a fundamental primitive in cryptography and distributed computing, and minimizing its round complexity is of paramount importance. It is long known that any randomized $r$-round protocol must fail with probability at least $(c\cdot r)^{-r}$, for some constant $c$, when the number of corruptions is linear in the number of parties, $t = \theta(n)$. On the other hand, current protocols fail with probability at least $2^{-r}$. Whether we can match the lower bound agreement probability remains unknown. In this work, we resolve this long-standing open question. We present a protocol that matches the lower bound up to constant factors. Our results hold under a (strongly rushing) adaptive adversary that can corrupt up to $t = (1-\epsilon)n/2$ parties, and our protocols use a public-key infrastructure and a trusted setup for unique threshold signatures. This is the first protocol that decreases the failure probability (overall) by a 'super-constant' factor per round.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2022-03-02: last updated
- 2022-03-02: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/255
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/255,
author = {Diana Ghinea and Vipul Goyal and Chen-Da Liu-Zhang},
title = {Round-Optimal Byzantine Agreement},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/255},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/255}
}