Paper 2022/449 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/449 ↗

On End-to-End Encryption

Britta Hale
Chelsea Komlo
Abstract

End-to-end encryption (E2EE) is vitally important to security and privacy online, yet currently under-defined. In this note, we map intuitive notions of end-to-end encryption to existing notions of encryption. In particular, we introduce the notion of endness as an notion which end-to-end systems must achieve in addition to traditional security notions associated with encryption, and provide formalizations to capture practical requirements. We demonstrate how the notion of encryption plus endness relates to a variety of case studies that either meet normative security understanding of E2EE or are considered normative failures. Finally, we extend these observations to authentication, and real-world authenticated channel use variants, including authenticated encryption with associated data and message franking.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2022-04-12: last updated
2022-04-12: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/449
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/449,
      author = {Britta Hale and Chelsea Komlo},
      title = {On End-to-End Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/449},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/449}
}
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