Paper 2022/492 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/492 ↗
Towards Smart Contract-based Verification of Anonymous Credentials
Abstract
Smart contracts often need to verify identity-related information of their users. However, such information is typically confidential, and its verification requires access to off-chain resources. Given the isolation and privacy limitations of blockchain technologies, this presents a problem for on-chain verification. In this paper, we show how CL-signature-based anonymous credentials can be verified in smart contracts using the example of Hyperledger Indy, a decentralized credential management platform, and Ethereum, a smart contract-enabled blockchain. Therefore, we first outline how smart contract-based verification can be integrated in the Hyperledger Indy credential management routine and, then, provide a technical evaluation based on a proof-of-concept implementation of CL-signature verification on Ethereum. While our results demonstrate technical feasibility of smart contract-based verification of anonymous credentials, they also reveal technical barriers for its real-world usage.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2022-04-23: last updated
- 2022-04-23: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/492
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/492,
author = {Robert Muth and Tarek Galal and Jonathan Heiss and Florian Tschorsch},
title = {Towards Smart Contract-based Verification of Anonymous Credentials},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/492},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/492}
}