Paper 2022/523 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/523 ↗
A side-channel based disassembler for the ARM-Cortex M0
Abstract
The most common application for side-channel attacks is the extraction of secret information, such as key material, from the implementation of a cryptographic algorithm. However, using side-channel information, we can extract other types of information related to the internal state of a computing device, such as the instructions executed and the content of registers. We used machine learning to build a side-channel disassembler for the ARM-Cortex M0 architecture, which can extract the executed instructions from the power traces of the device. Our disassembler achieves a success rate of 99% under ideal conditions and 88.2% under realistic conditions when distinguishing between groups of instructions. We also provide an overview of the lessons learned in relation to data preparation and noise minimization techniques.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2022-05-02: last updated
- 2022-05-02: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/523
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/523,
author = {Jurian van Geest and Ileana Buhan},
title = {A side-channel based disassembler for the ARM-Cortex M0},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/523},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/523}
}