Paper 2022/635 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/635 ↗
Post-Quantum Secure Boot on Vehicle Network Processors
Abstract
The ability to trust a system to act safely and securely strongly relies on the integrity of the software that it runs. To guarantee authenticity of the software one can include cryptographic data such as digital signatures on application images that can only be generated by trusted parties. These are typically based on cryptographic primitives such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) or Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC), whose security will be lost whenever a large enough quantum computer is built. For that reason, migration towards Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is necessary. This paper investigates the practical impact of migrating the secure boot flow on a Vehicle Network Processor (S32G274A) towards PQC. We create a low-memory fault-attack- resistant implementation of the Dilithium signature verification algorithm and evaluate its impact on the boot flow.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2022-05-23: last updated
- 2022-05-23: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/635
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/635,
author = {Joppe W. Bos and Brian Carlson and Joost Renes and Marius Rotaru and Daan Sprenkels and Geoffrey P. Waters},
title = {Post-Quantum Secure Boot on Vehicle Network Processors},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/635},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/635}
}