Paper 2022/685 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/685 ↗
Error Leakage using Timing Channel in FHE Ciphertexts from TFHE Library
Abstract
Timing attack is a class of side-channel attacks that aims to leak secret information based on the time it takes to perform different operations. The biggest advantage of a timing attack is that it does not require sophisticated or expensive equipment to be carried out. Side Channels on FHE schemes have been reported on the client side which has the secret key. But the present project aims to delve into the counter intuitive question, can an analysis be performed on the server end which ideally has no information of the secret key. In this report, we investigate when homomorphic operations are performed on the ciphertexts stored in the server, can timing reveal information of the error used to mask the ciphertexts? Finally, can this be utilized to determine the secret key of the ciphering technique?
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2022-05-31: last updated
- 2022-05-31: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/685
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/685,
author = {Bhuvnesh Chaturvedi and Anirban Chakraborty and Ayantika Chatterjee and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay},
title = {Error Leakage using Timing Channel in FHE Ciphertexts from TFHE Library},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/685},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/685}
}