Paper 2022/895 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/895 ↗
Security Analysis of RSA-BSSA
Abstract
In a blind signature scheme, a user can obtain a digital signature on a message of her choice without revealing anything about the message or the resulting signature to the signer. Blind signature schemes have recently found applications for privacy-preserving web browsing and ad ecosystems, and as such, are ripe for standardization. In this paper, we show that the recent proposed standard of Denis, Jacobs and Wood [18, 17] constitutes a strongly one-more-unforgeable blind signature scheme in the random-oracle model under the one-more-RSA assumption. Fur- ther, we show that the blind version of RSA-FDH proposed and analyzed by Bellare, Namprempre, Pointcheval and Semanko [6] does not satisfy blindness when the public key is chosen maliciously, but satisfies a weaker notion of a blind token.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-03-10: last updated
- 2022-07-08: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/895
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/895,
author = {Anna Lysyanskaya},
title = {Security Analysis of RSA-BSSA},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/895},
year = {2022},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/895}
}