Paper 2022/970 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/970 ↗

Related-key attacks on the compression function of Streebog

Vitaly Kiryukhin
Abstract

Related-key attacks against block ciphers are often considered unrealistic. In practice, as far as possible, the existence of a known "relation" between the secret encryption keys is avoided. Despite this, related keys arise directly in some widely used keyed hash functions. This is especially true for HMAC-Streebog, where known constants and manipulated parameters are added to the secret key. The relation is determined by addition modulo $2$ and $2^{n}$. The security of HMAC reduces to the properties of the underlying compression function. Therefore, as an initial analysis we propose key-recovery methods for 10 and 11 rounds (out of 12) of Streebog compression function in the related-key setting. The result shows that Streebog successfully resists attacks even in the model with such powerful adversaries.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2022-07-28: last updated
2022-07-28: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/970
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/970,
      author = {Vitaly Kiryukhin},
      title = {Related-key attacks on the compression function of Streebog},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/970},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/970}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.