Paper 2022/991 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2022/991 ↗

Coefficient Grouping: Breaking Chaghri and More

Fukang Liu
Ravi Anand
Libo Wang
Willi Meier
Takanori Isobe
Abstract

We propose an efficient technique called coefficient grouping to evaluate the algebraic degree of the FHE-friendly cipher Chaghri, which has been accepted for ACM CCS 2022. It is found that the algebraic degree increases linearly rather than exponentially. As a consequence, we can construct a 13-round distinguisher with time and data complexity of $2^{63}$ and mount a 13.5-round key-recovery attack. In particular, a higher-order differential attack on 8 rounds of Chaghri can be achieved with time and data complexity of $2^{38}$. Hence, it indicates that the full 8 rounds are far from being secure. Furthermore, we also demonstrate the application of our coefficient grouping technique to the design of secure cryptographic components. As a result, a countermeasure is found for Chaghri and it has little overhead compared with the original design. Since more and more symmetric primitives defined over a large finite field are emerging, we believe our new technique can have more applications in the future research.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2023-02-21: last updated
2022-08-03: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/991
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/991,
      author = {Fukang Liu and Ravi Anand and Libo Wang and Willi Meier and Takanori Isobe},
      title = {Coefficient Grouping: Breaking Chaghri and More},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/991},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/991}
}
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