Paper 2023/1056 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1056 ↗
DIDO: Data Provenance from Restricted TLS 1.3 Websites
Abstract
Public data can be authenticated by obtaining from a trustworthy website with TLS. Private data, such as user profile, are usually restricted from public access. If a user wants to authenticate his private data (e.g., address) provided by a restricted website (e.g., user profile page of a utility company website) to a verifier, he cannot simply give his username and password to the verifier. DECO (CCS 2020) provides a solution for liberating these data without introducing undesirable trust assumption, nor requiring server-side modification. Their implementation is mainly based on TLS 1.2. In this paper, we propose an optimized solution for TLS 1.3 websites. We tackle a number of open problems, including the support of X25519 key exchange in TLS 1.3, the design of round-optimal three-party key exchange, the architecture of two-party computation of TLS 1.3 key scheduling, and circuit design optimized for two-party computation. We test our implementation with real world website and show that our optimization is necessary to avoid timeout in TLS handshake.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-07-06: last updated
- 2023-07-06: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1056
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1056,
author = {Kwan Yin Chan and Handong Cui and Tsz Hon Yuen},
title = {DIDO: Data Provenance from Restricted TLS 1.3 Websites},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1056},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1056}
}