Paper 2023/1063 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1063 ↗
DiStefano: Decentralized Infrastructure for Sharing Trusted Encrypted Facts and Nothing More
Abstract
We design DiStefano: an efficient, maliciously-secure framework for generating private commitments over TLS-encrypted web traffic, for verification by a designated third-party. DiStefano provides many improvements over previous TLS commitment systems, including: a modular protocol specific to TLS 1.3, support for arbitrary verifiable claims over encrypted data, client browsing history privacy amongst pre-approved TLS servers, and various optimisations to ensure fast online performance of the TLS 1.3 session. We build a permissive open-source implementation of DiStefano integrated into the BoringSSL cryptographic library (used by Chromium-based Internet browsers). We show that DiStefano is practical in both LAN and WAN settings for committing to facts in arbitrary TLS traffic, requiring \(<\) 1 s and \(≤\) 80 KiB to execute the complete online phase of the protocol.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2026-04-02: last updated
- 2023-07-07: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1063
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1063,
author = {Sofía Celi and Alex Davidson and Hamed Haddadi and Gonçalo Pestana and Joe Rowell},
title = {DiStefano: Decentralized Infrastructure for Sharing Trusted Encrypted Facts and Nothing More},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1063},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1063}
}