Paper 2023/1199 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1199 ↗

RSA Blind Signatures with Public Metadata

Ghous Amjad
Kevin Yeo
Moti Yung
Abstract

Anonymous tokens are, essentially, digital signature schemes that enable issuers to provide users with signatures without learning the user inputs or the final signatures. These primitives allow applications to propagate trust while simultaneously protecting the user identity. They have become a core component for improving the privacy of several real-world applications including ad measurements, authorization protocols, spam detection, and VPNs. In certain applications, it is natural to associate signatures with specific public metadata, ensuring that trust is only propagated with respect to only a certain set of users and scenarios. To solve this, we study the notion of anonymous tokens with public metadata. We present a variant of RSA blind signatures with public metadata where issuers may only generate signatures that verify for a certain choice of public metadata a modification of a scheme by Abe and Fujisaki [9]. Our protocol exclusively uses standard cryptography with widely available implementations. We prove security from the one-more RSA assumptions with multiple exponents that we introduce. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the concrete security bounds should be nearly identical to standard RSA blind signatures. We show that our protocol incurs minimal overhead over standard RSA blind signatures and report anonymous telemetry for a real-world deployment to showcase its scalability. Moreover, the protocol in this paper has been proposed as a technical specification in an IRTF internet draft [12].

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2025-01-16: last updated
2023-08-08: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1199
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1199,
      author = {Ghous Amjad and Kevin Yeo and Moti Yung},
      title = {RSA Blind Signatures with Public Metadata},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1199},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1199}
}
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