Paper 2023/1205 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1205 ↗
On the security of REDOG
Abstract
We analyze REDOG, a public-key encryption system submitted to the Korean competition on post-quantum cryptography. REDOG is based on rank-metric codes. We prove its incorrectness and attack its implementation, providing an efficient message recovery attack. Furthermore, we show that the security of REDOG is much lower than claimed. We then proceed to mitigate these issues and provide two approaches to fix the decryption issue, one of which also leads to better security.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-11-15: last updated
- 2023-08-08: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1205
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1205,
author = {Tanja Lange and Alex Pellegrini and Alberto Ravagnani},
title = {On the security of REDOG},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1205},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1205}
}