Paper 2023/1285 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1285 ↗

Waffle: An Online Oblivious Datastore for Protecting Data Access Patterns

Sujaya Maiyya
Sharath Vemula
Divyakant Agrawal
Amr El Abbadi
Florian Kerschbaum
Abstract

We present Waffle, a datastore that protects an application’s data access patterns from a passive persistent adversary. Waffle achieves this without prior knowledge of the input data access distribution, making it the first of its kind to adaptively handle input sequences under a passive persistent adversary. Waffle maintains a constant bandwidth and client-side storage overhead, which can be adjusted to suit the application owner’s preferences. This flexibility allows the owner to fine-tune system parameters and strike a balance between security and performance. Our evaluation, utilizing the Yahoo! Cloud Serving Benchmark (YCSB) benchmark and Redis as the backend storage, demonstrates promising results. The insecure baseline outperforms Waffle by a mere 5-6x, whereas Waffle outperforms Pancake—a state-of-the-art oblivious datastore under passive persistent adversaries—by 45-57%, and a concurrent ORAM system, TaoStore, by 102x.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2023-10-18: last updated
2023-08-27: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1285
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1285,
      author = {Sujaya Maiyya and Sharath Vemula and Divyakant Agrawal and Amr El Abbadi and Florian Kerschbaum},
      title = {Waffle: An Online Oblivious Datastore for Protecting Data Access Patterns},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1285},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1285}
}
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