Paper 2023/1336 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1336 ↗
Riggs: Decentralized Sealed-Bid Auctions
Abstract
We introduce the first practical protocols for fully decentralized sealed-bid auctions using timed commitments. Timed commitments ensure that the auction is finalized fairly even if all participants drop out after posting bids or if $n-1$ bidders collude to try to learn the $n^{th}$ bidder’s bid value. Our protocols rely on a novel non-malleable timed commitment scheme which efficiently supports range proofs to establish that bidders have sufficient funds to cover a hidden bid value. This allows us to penalize users who abandon bids for exactly the bid value, while supporting simultaneous bidding in multiple auctions with a shared collateral pool. Our protocols are concretely efficient and we have implemented them in an Ethereum- compatible smart contract which automatically enforces payment and delivery of an auctioned digital asset.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-09-07: last updated
- 2023-09-07: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1336
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1336,
author = {Nirvan Tyagi and Arasu Arun and Cody Freitag and Riad Wahby and Joseph Bonneau and David Mazières},
title = {Riggs: Decentralized Sealed-Bid Auctions},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1336},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1336}
}