Paper 2023/1344 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1344 ↗

Analyzing the Real-World Security of the Algorand Blockchain

Fabrice Benhamouda
Erica Blum
Jonathan Katz
Derek Leung
Julian Loss
Tal Rabin
Abstract

The Algorand consensus protocol is interesting both in theory and in practice. On the theoretical side, to achieve adaptive security, it introduces the novel idea of player replaceability, where each step of the protocol is executed by a different randomly selected committee whose members remain secret until they send their first and only message. The protocol provides consistency under arbitrary network conditions and liveness under intermittent network partitions. On the practical side, the protocol is used to secure the Algorand cryptocurrency, whose total value is approximately $850M at the time of writing. The Algorand protocol in use differs substantially from the protocols described in the published literature on Algorand. Despite its significance, it lacks a formal analysis. In this work, we describe and analyze the Algorand consensus protocol as deployed today in Algorand’s ecosystem. We show that the overall protocol framework is sound by characterizing network conditions and parameter settings under which the protocol can be proven secure.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2023-11-23: last updated
2023-09-08: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1344
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1344,
      author = {Fabrice Benhamouda and Erica Blum and Jonathan Katz and Derek Leung and Julian Loss and Tal Rabin},
      title = {Analyzing the Real-World Security of the Algorand Blockchain},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1344},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1344}
}
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