Paper 2023/1419 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1419 ↗
Improving the Rectangle Attack on GIFT-64
Abstract
GIFT is a family of lightweight block ciphers based on SPN structure and composed of two versions named GIFT-64 and GIFT-128. In this paper, we reevaluate the security of GIFT-64 against the rectangle attack under the related-key setting. Investigating the previous rectangle key recovery attack on GIFT-64, we obtain the core idea of improving the attack——trading off the time complexity of each attack phase. We flexibly guess part of the involved subkey bits to balance the time cost of each phase so that the overall time complexity of the attack is reduced. Moreover, the reused subkey bits are identified according to the linear key schedule of GIFT-64 and bring additional advantages for our attacks. Furthermore, we incorporate the above ideas and propose a dedicated MILP model for finding the best rectangle key recovery attack on GIFT-64. As a result, we get the improved rectangle attacks on 26-round GIFT-64, which are the best attacks on it in terms of time complexity so far.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-09-24: last updated
- 2023-09-20: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1419
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1419,
author = {Yincen Chen and Nana Zhang and Xuanyu Liang and Ling Song and Qianqian Yang and Zhuohui Feng},
title = {Improving the Rectangle Attack on GIFT-64},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1419},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1419}
}