Paper 2023/1442 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1442 ↗
Everlasting ROBOT: the Marvin Attack
Abstract
In this paper we show that Bleichenbacher-style attacks on RSA decryption are not only still possible, but also that vulnerable implementations are common. We have successfully attacked multiple implementations using only timing of decryption operation and shown that many others are vulnerable. To perform the attack we used more statistically rigorous techniques like the sign test, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, and bootstrapping of median of pairwise differences. We publish a set of tools for testing libraries that perform RSA decryption against timing side-channel attacks, including one that can test arbitrary TLS servers with no need to write a test harnesses. Finally, we propose a set of workarounds that implementations can employ if they can't avoid the use of RSA.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-09-21: last updated
- 2023-09-21: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1442
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1442,
author = {Hubert Kario},
title = {Everlasting ROBOT: the Marvin Attack},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1442},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1442}
}