Paper 2023/1595 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1595 ↗

CDLS: Proving Knowledge of Committed Discrete Logarithms with Soundness

Sofia Celi
Shai Levin
Joe Rowell
Abstract

$\Sigma$-protocols, a class of interactive two-party protocols, which are used as a framework to instantiate many other authentication schemes, are automatically a proof of knowledge (PoK) given that they satisfy the "special-soundness" property. This fact provides a convenient method to compose $\Sigma$-protocols and PoKs for complex relations. However, composing in this manner can be error-prone. While they must satisfy special-soundness, this is unfortunately not the case for many recently proposed composed practical schemes. Here we explore two schemes: ZKAttest from Faz-Hernández et al. and the ones from Agrawal et al., and show that their $\Sigma$-protocol's suffer from several security misdesigns which invalidate their security proofs, and state a practical cheap attack on ZKAttest's implementation. By exploring and resolving their misdesigns, we propose CDLS, a sound and secure variant of their protocols.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2024-01-05: last updated
2023-10-14: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1595
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1595,
      author = {Sofia Celi and Shai Levin and Joe Rowell},
      title = {CDLS: Proving Knowledge of Committed Discrete Logarithms with Soundness},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1595},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1595}
}
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