Paper 2023/1698 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1698 ↗
Another Look at Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes
Abstract
The idea of balancing the side-channel leakage in software was proposed more than a decade ago. Just like with other hiding-based countermeasures, the goal is not to hide the leakage completely but to significantly increase the effort required for the attack. Previous approaches focused on two directions: either balancing the Hamming weight of the processed data or deriving the code by using stochastic leakage profiling. In this brief, we build upon these results by proposing a novel approach that combines the two directions. We provide the theory behind our encoding scheme backed by experimental results on a 32-bit ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. Our results show that such a combination gives better side-channel resistance properties than each of the two methods separately.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-11-02: last updated
- 2023-11-02: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1698
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1698,
author = {Xiaolu Hou and Jakub Breier and Mladen Kovačević},
title = {Another Look at Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1698},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1698}
}