Paper 2023/1706 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1706 ↗
Breaking two PSI-CA protocols in polynomial time
Abstract
Private Set Intersection Cardinality(PSI-CA) is a type of secure two-party computation. It enables two parties, each holding a private set, to jointly compute the cardinality of their intersection without revealing any other private information about their respective sets. In this paper, we manage to break two PSI-CA protocols by recovering the specific intersection items in polynomial time. Among them, the PSI-CA protocol proposed by De Cristofaro et al. in 2012 is the most popular PSI-CA protocol based on the Google Scholar search results and it is still deemed one of the most efficient PSI-CA protocols. In this paper, we also propose several solutions to these protocols' security problems.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-11-03: last updated
- 2023-11-03: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1706
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1706,
author = {Yang Tan and Bo Lv},
title = {Breaking two PSI-CA protocols in polynomial time},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1706},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1706}
}