Paper 2023/1771 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1771 ↗
A note on ``HAKECC: highly efficient authentication and key agreement scheme based on ECDH for RFID in IOT environment''
Abstract
We show that the Nikooghadam-Shahriari-Saeidi authentication and key agreement scheme [J. Inf. Secur. Appl., 76, 103523 (2023)] cannot resist impersonation attack, not as claimed. An adversary can impersonate the RFID reader to cheat the RFID tag. The drawback results from its simple secret key invoking mechanism. We also find it seems difficult to revise the scheme due to the inherent flaw.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-11-16: last updated
- 2023-11-16: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1771
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1771,
author = {Zhengjun Cao},
title = {A note on ``HAKECC: highly efficient authentication and key agreement scheme based on ECDH for RFID in IOT environment''},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1771},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1771}
}