Paper 2023/1791 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1791 ↗
Decentralized Compromise-Tolerant Public Key Management Ecosystem with Threshold Validation
Abstract
This paper examines the vulnerabilities inherent in prevailing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) systems reliant on centralized Certificate Authorities (CAs), wherein a compromise of the CA introduces risks to the integrity of public key management. We present PKChain, a decentralized and compromise-tolerant public key management system built on blockchain technology, offering transparent, tamper-resistant, and verifiable services for key operations such as registration, update, query, validation, and revocation. Our innovative approach involves a novel threshold block validation scheme that combines a novel threshold cryptographic scheme with blockchain consensus. This scheme allows each validator to validate each public key record partially and proactively secures it before inclusion in a block. Additionally, to further validate and verify each block and to facilitate public verification of the public key records, we introduce an aggregate commitment signature scheme. Our contribution extends to the development of a new, efficient, and practical Byzantine Compromise-Tolerant and Verifiable (pBCTV) consensus model, integrating the proposed validation and signature schemes with practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (pBFT). Through a comprehensive examination encompassing security analysis, performance evaluation, and a prototype implementation, we substantiate that PKChain is a secure, efficient, and robust solution for public key management.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-11-20: last updated
- 2023-11-20: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1791
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1791,
author = {Jamal Mosakheil and Kan Yang},
title = {Decentralized Compromise-Tolerant Public Key Management Ecosystem with Threshold Validation},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1791},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1791}
}