Paper 2023/1818 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1818 ↗

On Instantiating Unleveled Fully-Homomorphic Signatures from Falsifiable Assumptions

Romain Gay
Bogdan Ursu
Abstract

We build the first unleveled fully homomorphic signature scheme in the standard model. Our scheme is not constrained by any a-priori bound on the depth of the functions that can be homomorphically evaluated, and relies on subexponentially-secure indistinguishability obfuscation, fully-homomorphic encryption and a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof system with composable zero-knowledge. Our scheme is also the first to satisfy the strong security notion of context-hiding for an unbounded number of levels, ensuring that signatures computed homomorphically do not leak the original messages from which they were computed. All building blocks are instantiable from falsifiable assumptions in the standard model, avoiding the need for knowledge assumptions. The main difficulty we overcome stems from the fact that bootstrapping, which is a crucial tool for obtaining unleveled fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), has no equivalent for homomorphic signatures, requiring us to use novel techniques.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2024-01-23: last updated
2023-11-24: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1818
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1818,
      author = {Romain Gay and Bogdan Ursu},
      title = {On Instantiating Unleveled Fully-Homomorphic Signatures from Falsifiable Assumptions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1818},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1818}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.