Paper 2023/1822 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1822 ↗
Rectangular Attack on VOX
Abstract
VOX has been submitted to the NIST Round 1 Additional Signature of the Post-Quantum Signature Competition in June 2023. VOX is a strengthened variant of UOV which uses the Quotient-Ring (QR) setting to reduce the public-key size. At the end of August 2023, Furue and Ikamatsu posted on the NIST mailing-list a post, indicating that the parameters of VOX can be attacked efficiently using the rectangular attack in the QR setting. In this note, we explain the attack in the specific case of VOX, we detail the complexity, and show that as Furue and Ikematsu indicated, the attack can be completely avoided by adding one more constraint on the parameter selection. Finally, we show that this constraint does not increase the sizes of the public keys or signature.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-12-02: last updated
- 2023-11-27: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1822
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1822,
author = {Gilles Macario-Rat and Jacques Patarin and Benoit Cogliati and Jean-Charles Faugère and Pierre-Alain Fouque and Louis Gouin and Robin Larrieu and Brice Minaud},
title = {Rectangular Attack on VOX},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1822},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1822}
}