Paper 2023/1873 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1873 ↗

SoK: Post-Quantum TLS Handshake

Nouri Alnahawi
Johannes Müller
Jan Oupický
Alexander Wiesmaier
Abstract

Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the backbone security protocol of the Internet. As this fundamental protocol is at risk from future quantum attackers, many proposals have been made to protect TLS against this threat by implementing post-quantum cryptography (PQC). The widespread interest in post-quantum TLS has given rise to a large number of solutions over the last decade. These proposals differ in many aspects, including the security properties they seek to protect, the efficiency and trustworthiness of their post-quantum building blocks, and the application scenarios they consider, to name a few. Based on an extensive literature review, we classify existing solutions according to their general approaches, analyze their individual contributions, and present the results of our extensive performance experiments. Based on these insights, we identify the most reasonable candidates for post-quantum TLS, which research problems in this area have already been solved, and which are still open. Overall, our work provides a well-founded reference point for researching post-quantum TLS and preparing TLS in practice for the quantum age.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2024-07-24: last updated
2023-12-06: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1873
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1873,
      author = {Nouri Alnahawi and Johannes Müller and Jan Oupický and Alexander Wiesmaier},
      title = {SoK: Post-Quantum TLS Handshake},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1873},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1873}
}
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