Paper 2023/1905 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/1905 ↗
Oops, I did it again revisited: another look at reusing one-time signatures
Abstract
In "Oops, I did it again" - Security of One-Time Signatures under Two-Message Attacks, Bruinderink and Hülsing analyzed the effect of key reuse for several one time signature systems. When they analyzed the Winternitz system, they assumed certain probabilities were independent when they weren't, leading to invalid conclusions. This paper does a more correct characterization of the Winternitz scheme, and while their ultimate conclusion (that key reuse allows for practical forgeries) is correct, the situation is both better and worse than what they concluded.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-12-13: last updated
- 2023-12-11: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1905
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1905,
author = {Scott Fluhrer},
title = {Oops, I did it again revisited: another look at reusing one-time signatures},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1905},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1905}
}