Paper 2023/308 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/308 ↗

Punctured Syndrome Decoding Problem Efficient Side-Channel Attacks Against Classic McEliece

Vincent Grosso
Pierre-Louis Cayrel
Brice Colombier
Vlad-Florin Dragoi
Abstract

Among the fourth round finalists of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process for public-key encryption algorithms and key encapsulation mechanisms, three rely on hard problems from coding theory. Key encapsulation mechanisms are frequently used in hybrid cryptographic systems: a public-key algorithm for key exchange and a secret key algorithm for communication. A major point is thus the initial key exchange that is performed thanks to a key encapsulation mechanism. In this paper, we analyze side-channel vulnerabilities of the key encapsulation mechanism implemented by the Classic McEliece cryptosystem, whose security is based on the syndrome decoding problem. We use side-channel leakages to reduce the complexity of the syndrome decoding problem by reducing the length of the code considered. The columns punctured from the original code reduce the complexity of a hard problem from coding theory. This approach leads to efficient profiled side-channel attacks that recover the session key with high success rates, even in noisy scenarios.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2023-03-02: last updated
2023-03-02: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/308
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/308,
      author = {Vincent Grosso and Pierre-Louis Cayrel and Brice Colombier and Vlad-Florin Dragoi},
      title = {Punctured Syndrome Decoding Problem Efficient Side-Channel Attacks Against Classic McEliece},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/308},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/308}
}
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