Paper 2023/337 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/337 ↗

Quantum Implementation of AIM: Aiming for Low-Depth

Kyungbae Jang
Dukyoung Kim
Yujin Oh
Sejin Lim
Yujin Yang
Hyunji Kim
Hwajeong Seo
Abstract

Security vulnerabilities in the symmetric-key primitives of a cipher can undermine the overall security claims of the cipher. With the rapid advancement of quantum computing in recent years, there is an increasing effort to evaluate the security of symmetric-key cryptography against potential quantum attacks. This paper focuses on analyzing the quantum attack resistance of AIM, a symmetric-key primitive used in the AIMer digital signature scheme. We presents the first quantum circuit implementation of AIM and estimates its complexity (such as qubit count, gate count, and circuit depth) with respect to Grover's search algorithm. For Grover's key search, the most important optimization metric is the depth, especially when considering parallel search. Our implementation gathers multiple methods for a low-depth quantum circuit of AIM in order to reduce the Toffoli depth and full depth.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2023-10-11: last updated
2023-03-07: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/337
License
https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/337,
      author = {Kyungbae Jang and Dukyoung Kim and Yujin Oh and Sejin Lim and Yujin Yang and Hyunji Kim and Hwajeong Seo},
      title = {Quantum Implementation of AIM: Aiming for Low-Depth},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/337},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/337}
}
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