Paper 2023/361 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/361 ↗
Authenticated Encryption for Very Short Inputs
Abstract
We study authenticated encryption (AE) modes dedicated to very short messages, which are crucial for Internet-of-things applications. Since the existing general-purpose AE modes need at least three block cipher calls for non-empty messages, we explore the design space for AE modes that use at most two calls. We proposed a family of AE modes, dubbed Manx, that work when the total input length is less than $2n$ bits, using an $n$-bit block cipher. Notably, the second construction of Manx can encrypt almost n-bit plaintext and saves one or two block cipher calls from the standard modes, such as GCM or OCB, keeping the comparable provable security. We also present benchmarks on popular 8/32-bit microprocessors using AES. Our results show the clear advantage of Manx over the previous modes for such short messages.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-03-12: last updated
- 2023-03-12: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/361
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/361,
author = {Alexandre Adomnicai and Kazuhiko Minematsu and Junji Shikata},
title = {Authenticated Encryption for Very Short Inputs},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/361},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/361}
}