Paper 2023/407 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/407 ↗

Game Theoretical Analysis of DAG-Ledgers Backbone

Abstract

We study the rational behaviors of agents in DAG-Based Distributed Ledgers. We an- alyze generic algorithms that encapsulate the main actions of agents in a DAG-based dis- tributed ledger: voting for a block, and checking its validity. Knowing that those actions have costs, and validating a block gives rewards to agents who participated in the validation procedure, we study using game theory how strategic agents behave while trying to maximize their gains. We consider scenarios with different type of agents and investigate if there exist equilibria where the properties of the protocols are guaranteed. The analysis is focused on the study of equilibria when invalid blocks may be issued. We found that in such a case, there exist equilibria where protocols properties may be violated. However, we also show that in all studied cases, there exist equilibria satifisfying the protocol properties.