Paper 2023/423 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/423 ↗

A Note on Hybrid Signature Schemes

Nina Bindel
Britta Hale
Abstract

This draft presents work-in-progress concerning hybrid/composite signature schemes. More concretely, we give several tailored combinations of Fiat-Shamir based signature schemes (such as Dilithium) or Falcon with RSA or DSA. We observe that there are a number of signature hybridization goals, few of which are not achieved through parallel signing or concatenation approaches. These include proof composability (that the post-quantum hybrid signature security can easily be linked to the component algorithms), weak separability, strong separability, backwards compatibility, hybrid generality (i.e., hybrid compositions that can be instantiated with different algorithms once proven to be secure), and simultaneous verification. We do not consider backwards compatibility in this work, but aim in our constructions to show the feasibility of achieving all other properties. As a work-in-progress, the constructions are presented without the accompanying formal security analysis, to be included in an update.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2023-07-22: last updated
2023-03-23: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/423
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/423,
      author = {Nina Bindel and Britta Hale},
      title = {A Note on Hybrid Signature Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/423},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/423}
}
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