Paper 2023/492 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/492 ↗

Batch Signatures, Revisited

Carlos Aguilar-Melchor
Martin R. Albrecht
Thomas Bailleux
Nina Bindel
James Howe
Andreas Hülsing
David Joseph
Marc Manzano
Abstract

We revisit batch signatures (previously considered in a draft RFC, and used in multiple recent works), where a single, potentially expensive, "inner" digital signature authenticates a Merkle tree constructed from many messages. We formalise a construction and prove its unforgeability and privacy properties. We also show that batch signing allows us to scale slow signing algorithms, such as those recently selected for standardisation as part of NIST's post-quantum project, to high throughput, with a mild increase in latency. For the example of Falcon-512 in TLS, we can increase the amount of connections per second by a factor 3.2x, at the cost of an increase in the signature size by ~14% and the median latency by ~25%, where both are ran on the same 30 core server. We also discuss applications where batch signatures allow us to increase throughput and to save bandwidth. For example, again for Falcon-512, once one batch signature is available, the additional bandwidth for each of the remaining N-1 is only 82 bytes.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2023-04-04: last updated
2023-04-04: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/492
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/492,
      author = {Carlos Aguilar-Melchor and Martin R. Albrecht and Thomas Bailleux and Nina Bindel and James Howe and Andreas Hülsing and David Joseph and Marc Manzano},
      title = {Batch Signatures, Revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/492},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/492}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.