Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion

James Bartusek; Dakshita Khurana; Giulio Malavolta; Alexander Poremba; Michael Walter

Paper 2023/559 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/559 ↗

Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion

James Bartusek

Dakshita Khurana

Giulio Malavolta

Alexander Poremba

Michael Walter

Abstract

We develop a simple compiler that generically adds publicly-verifiable deletion to a variety of cryptosystems. Our compiler only makes use of one-way functions (or one-way state generators, if we allow the public verification key to be quantum). Previously, similar compilers either relied on the use of indistinguishability obfuscation (Bartusek et. al., ePrint:2023/265) or almost-regular one-way functions (Bartusek, Khurana and Poremba, arXiv:2303.08676).

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2023-10-16: last updated; 2023-04-19: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2023/559
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/559,
      author = {James Bartusek and Dakshita Khurana and Giulio Malavolta and Alexander Poremba and Michael Walter},
      title = {Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/559},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/559}
}