Paper 2023/624 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/624 ↗
HAETAE: Shorter Lattice-Based Fiat-Shamir Signatures
Abstract
We present HAETAE (Hyperball bimodAl modulE rejecTion signAture schemE), a new lattice-based signature scheme. Like the NIST-selected Dilithium signature scheme, HAETAE is based on the Fiat-Shamir with Aborts paradigm, but our design choices target an improved complexity/compactness compromise that is highly relevant for many space-limited application scenarios. We primarily focus on reducing signature and verification key sizes so that signatures fit into one TCP or UDP datagram while preserving a high level of security against a variety of attacks. As a result, our scheme has signature and verification key sizes up to 39% and 25% smaller, respectively, compared than Dilithium. We provide a portable, constant-time reference implementation together with an optimized implementation using AVX2 instructions and an implementation with reduced stack size for the Cortex-M4. Moreover, we describe how to efficiently protect HAETAE against implementation attacks such as side-channel analysis, making it an attractive candidate for use in IoT and other embedded systems.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2024-07-04: last updated
- 2023-05-02: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/624
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/624,
author = {Jung Hee Cheon and Hyeongmin Choe and Julien Devevey and Tim Güneysu and Dongyeon Hong and Markus Krausz and Georg Land and Marc Möller and Damien Stehlé and MinJune Yi},
title = {HAETAE: Shorter Lattice-Based Fiat-Shamir Signatures},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/624},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/624}
}