Paper 2023/685 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/685 ↗

Third-Party Private Set Intersection

Foo Yee Yeo
Jason H. M. Ying
Abstract

Private set intersection (PSI) enables two parties, each holding a private set to compute their intersection without revealing other information in the process. We introduce a variant of conventional PSI termed as third-party PSI, whereby the intersection output of the two parties is only known to an inputless third party. In this setting, the two parties who participate in the protocol have no knowledge of the intersection result or any information of the set content of the other party. In general, third-party PSI settings arise where there is a need for an external party to obtain the intersection outcome without leakage of additional information to any other party. This setting is motivated by an increasing importance in several real-world applications. We describe protocols which achieve this functionality with minimal communication overhead. To the best of knowledge, our work is the first of its kind to explore this variant of PSI.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2023-06-26: last updated
2023-05-15: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/685
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/685,
      author = {Foo Yee Yeo and Jason H. M. Ying},
      title = {Third-Party Private Set Intersection},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/685},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/685}
}
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