Paper 2023/707 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/707 ↗
Concurrent Security of Anonymous Credentials Light, Revisited
Abstract
We revisit the concurrent security guarantees of the well-known Anonymous Credentials Light (ACL) scheme (Baldimtsi and Lysyanskaya, CCS'13). This scheme was originally proven secure when executed sequentially, and its concurrent security was left as an open problem. A later work of Benhamouda et al. (EUROCRYPT'21) gave an efficient attack on ACL when executed concurrently, seemingly resolving this question once and for all. In this work, we point out a subtle flaw in the attack of Benhamouda et al. on ACL and show, in spite of popular opinion, that it can be proven concurrently secure. Our modular proof in the algebraic group model uses an ID scheme as an intermediate step and leads to a major simplification of the complex security argument for Abe's Blind Signature scheme by Kastner et al. (PKC'22).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2025-01-08: last updated
- 2023-05-17: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/707
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/707,
author = {Julia Kastner and Julian Loss and Omar Renawi},
title = {Concurrent Security of Anonymous Credentials Light, Revisited},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/707},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/707}
}