Paper 2023/711 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/711 ↗
On the Quantum Security of HAWK
Abstract
In this paper, we prove the quantum security of the signature scheme HAWK, proposed by Ducas, Postlethwaite, Pulles and van Woerden (ASIACRYPT 2022). More precisely, we reduce its strong unforgeability in the quantum random oracle model (QROM) to the hardness of the one-more SVP problem, which is the computational problem on which also the classical security analysis of HAWK relies. Our security proof deals with the quantum aspects in a rather black-box way, making it accessible also to non-quantum-experts.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2023-05-17: last updated
- 2023-05-17: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/711
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/711,
author = {Serge Fehr and Yu-Hsuan Huang},
title = {On the Quantum Security of HAWK},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/711},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/711}
}