A Note on ``On the Design of Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol in Internet of Vehicles-Enabled Intelligent Transportation System''

Zhengjun Cao; Lihua Liu

Paper 2023/757 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2023/757 ↗

A Note on ``On the Design of Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol in Internet of Vehicles-Enabled Intelligent Transportation System''

Zhengjun Cao

Lihua Liu

Abstract

We remark that the key agreement scheme [IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol. 2021, 70(2): 1736--1751] fails to keep anonymity and untraceability, because the user $U_k$ needs to invoke the public key $PK_{U_j}$ to verify the signature generated by the user $U_j$. Since the public key is compulsively linked to the true identity $ID_{U_j}$ for authentication, any adversary can reveal the true identity by checking the signature.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2023-05-25: last updated; 2023-05-25: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2023/757
License: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/757,
      author = {Zhengjun Cao and Lihua Liu},
      title = {A Note on ``On the Design of Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol in Internet of Vehicles-Enabled Intelligent Transportation System''},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/757},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/757}
}